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CONTRACTS
I. INTRODUCTION
The decisions of the Tenth Circuit have covered a wide variety of
contract issues with no concentration in any particular area.' Holdings
ranged from the necessity of explanatory language in a full recourse as-
signment in order to constitute an unconditional guarantee 2 to the lack
of a fiduciary relationship between a manufacturer and a dealer because
of their relatively equal bargaining positions.3 The Tenth Circuit con-
tinues to validate the promises made by parties to a contract and to be
reluctant to find a fiduciary relationship where parties are in relatively
equal bargaining positions.
II. FULL RECOURSE ASSIGNMENT OF NONNEGOTIABLE DOCUMENTS,
ABSENT EXPLANATORY LANGUAGE, IS ONLY A CONDITIONAL
GUARANTEE: MERCANTILE BANK V. FARMERS &
MERCHANTS STATE BANK
4
Under Kansas law, the full recourse assignment of a nonnegotiable
instrument without any other explanatory language is only a conditional
guarantee. Kansas courts have defined two types of guarantees: condi-
tional and unconditional. 5 If the guarantee is conditional, the creditor
must attempt collection from the principal obligor before pursuing the
guarantor.
6
Mercantile State Bank (Mercantile) was assigned promissory notes
and related equipment leases by Farmers & Merchants State Bank
(F&M). The endorsement language on the notes assigning them to Mer-
cantile contained the words "without recourse" but the language on the
leases assigned was "with full recourse." When the lessees defaulted,
Mercantile sued F&M claiming F&M, as assignor of the notes, was re-
1. This survey Article discusses contract cases decided by the Tenth Circuit Court of
Appeals between December 1990 and December 1991. For more specific areas of con-
tracts combined with other areas of law see the following: for a dual decision in the area of
contracts and antitrust see COMCOA, Inc. v. NEC Telephones, Inc., 931 F.2d 655 (10th
Cir. 1991) (evidence in antitrust case supported use of the changing conditions defense);
for a discussion of contracts in an Intellectual Property setting see Harris Market Research
v. Marshall Marketing and Comm., Inc., 948 F.2d 1518 (10th Cir. 1991) (inconsistent ver-
dicts sustained allowing development costs as damages in copyright infringement claim).
2. Mercantile Bank v. Farmers & Merchants State Bank, 920 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir.
1990).
3. Devery Implement Co. v.J.I. Case Co., 944 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
4. 920 F.2d 1539 (10th Cir. 1990).
5. Kansas State Bank & Trust Co. v. DeLorean, 640 P.2d 343, 350 (Kan. Ct. App.
1982).
6. Id.; see KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-3-416 (1983) (guarantees distinguished by "collec-
tion guaranteed" or "payment guaranteed" added to signature; UNIFORM COMMERCIAL
CODE § 3-419(d) (if signautre is accompanied by words guaranteeing collection, the signor
is obligated to pay only if creditor has pursued collection from debtor).
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quired to honor the full recourse assignments of the leases.
7
The United States District Court in Kansas concluded that F&M's
assignment with "full recourse" was a unilateral mistake on F&M's part
and that F&M must bear the responsibility. However, the district court
found that F&M was only secondarily liable. This secondary liability re-
quired Mercantile to make collection efforts against the lessees before it
could recover from F&M. The district court then ruled in favor of F&M
on the grounds that Mercantile failed to attempt collection from the les-
sees prior to pursuing F&M as assignor of the notes.8 Mercantile
appealed.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed and remanded in
part. While noting that an assignor is not normally liable to the assignee
for breaches by the debtor, the Tenth Circuit stated that an assignment
"with full recourse" typically acts as a guarantee by the assignor in case
of breach.9 The next question was whether such a guarantee is uncondi-
tional. The Tenth Circuit accepted the district court's analogy to Article
3 of the Uniform Commercial Code and held that "'full recourse' as-
signment of nonnegotiable documents without any other explanatory lan-
guage is only a conditional guarantee."' 0
Although the Tenth Circuit agreed with the application of Article 3,
it found that the district court erred in applying those principles to four
of the five leases in question." 1 As the district court noted, secondary
liability of an endorser of a negotiable instrument is based on three con-
ditions: presentment, dishonor and notice of dishonor.' 2 In this case,
four out of five lessees signed guarantees that waived presentment.
Under Kansas law, a document which contains a waiver of presentment
by the assignor, is binding on all parties.' 3 Therefore, F&M was liable
on the four leases but not on the fifth lease which did not contain the
waiver. 14
III. PREFERENTIAL RIGHTS UNDER GOVERNMENT CONTRACT: HAMILTON
STORES, INC. v. HODEL 
1 5
Preferential rights arising out of a government contract can only be
asserted when the clear conditions of the rights have not been honored.
This case represents the first time a federal circuit court has addressed
these distinctions in preferential rights arising out of government
contracts.
Hamilton Stores, Inc. (Hamilton) was a concession contractor at
7. Mercantile Bank, 920 F.2d at 1541.
8. Id at 1543.
9. Id at 1544.
10. Id.
11. Id. at 1545.
12. Id.
13. KAN. STAT. ANN. § 84-3-511(6) (1983). "Where a waiver of presentment or notice
or protest is embodied in the instrument itself it is binding upon all parties. ...
14. Mercantile Bank, 920 F.2d at 1545.
15. 925 F.2d 1272 (10th Cir. 1991).
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Yellowstone National Park. Under the terms of its long-term contract,
Hamilton had a preferential right of first refusal for new or additional
services or accommodations. The Park Service had a similar contract
with another concessionaire, Yellowstone Park Co. but was dissatisfied
with its service. The Park Service therefore sought a new concessionaire
and invited bids, including one from Hamilton. When the Park Service
awarded the contract to another bidder, Hamilton sued claiming both
that the Park Service did not correctly follow statutory procedure, 16 and
that it failed to honor Hamilton's contractual rights. The district court
granted summary judgment to the Park Service.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's grant of summary
judgment. While Hamilton had a right to bid for the contract replacing
Yellowstone Park Co., the Park Service had no obligation to award the
contract to Hamilton. 17 The decision found that Hamilton's preferen-
tial rights to contract for new services were not jeopardized because the
awarded contract was not for new services or accomodations but for ex-
isting services. 18 The Park Service applied the proper regulation when
denying Hamilton's bid. 19
IV. EQUrrABLE RELIEF TO ALLOW LATE NOTICE OF LEASE RENEWAL:
CAR-X SERVICE SYSTEMS, INc. v. KIDD-HELLER
2 0
Equitable relief is appropriate, under Kansas law, even in the face of
a clear unambiguous lease when the lessee would suffer relatively great
harm compared with the harm imposed on the lessor. This approach to
equitable relief follows the tradition of Kansas law.2 1 This decision rep-
resents the first time the Tenth Circuit has analyzed the issue of equita-
ble relief where an unambiguous contract exists.
Kidd-Heller, a subtenant, leased real property to Car-X Services
Systems, Inc. (Car-X). The lease provided for a ten-year term with an
option to extend the lease for five years if six-months notice was pro-
vided. If the option was exercised, the lease payments were to increase.
Car-X then subleased to Mufflers of Kansas City, Inc. (Mufflers) which
opened an automobile repair shop on the premises. The sublease
agreement made Mufflers subject to the terms and conditions of the
lease agreement between Car-X and Kidd-Heller. A dispute arose over
Mufflers' failure to obtain permission for certain improvements to the
property and Kidd-Heller threatened suit. The situation was resolved
16. 36 C.F.R. § 51.6 (1980).
17. Hamilton Stores, 925 F.2d at 1281-82. Hamilton argued that the Park Service had
applied the wrong regulation in denying Hamilton's contract bid. Hamilton asserted that
the regulation applicable to additional services applied. 36 C.F.R. § 51.6 (1989).
18. Id. at 1281.
19. Id at 1282. See 36 C.F.R. § 51.4 (1989).
20. 927 F.2d 511 (10th Cir. 1991).
21. In a situatin where a contract must be forfeited because existing conditions make
strict performance unjust and inquitable, it is proper for the court to order equitable relief.
Id. at 515 (quoting Nelson v. Robinson, 336 P.2d 415, 420 (Kan. 1959)).
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when Mufflers agreed to pay additional monthly sums and Kidd-Heller
agreed not to file suit.
Car-X gave notice to renew the lease when the ten-year term ex-
pired, but this notice was not given six months prior to expiration as
required in the lease. Kidd-Heller then terminated the lease. Car-X
sought a district court action for equitable and other relief. The district
court found that equitable relief was available to allow acceptance of the
untimely renewal notice. The court also found that Kidd-Heller was un-
justly enriched by Mufflers' payment on the agreement to forbear suit
and ordered the return of $7,300.
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the grant of equitable relief22 but re-
versed the unjust enrichment award.23 Since Kansas law provided no
guidance, the district court looked to the trends in other jurisdictions
2 4
in ruling that equitable relief applied. Although the lease was clear and
unambiguous in its terms, Car-X would suffer relatively great harm if
forfeiture occurred. Car-X had operated a successful business on the
leased premises for ten years,2 5 and termination of its lease, which
would disrupt it operations would cause severe economic loss. The
court then balanced this with the incidental harm Kidd-Heller would
suffer since Kidd-Heller would continue to receive lease payments at an
increased rate and had taken no substantial steps to find another
lessor.
2 6
The Tenth Circuit reversed the award for unjust enrichment, find-
ing that forbearance to sue constitutes adequate consideration for a con-
tract.27 The Kansas Supreme Court has ruled that relinquishment of a
legal right is sufficient consideration for a promise, notwithstanding
whether the party would have prevailed in the threatened suit.28 How-
ever, forbearance as adequate consideration carries the requirement
that the claim be non-frivolous. 2 9 The Tenth Circuit then concluded
that Kidd-Heller had a reasonable and sincere belief in the validity of
22. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 517. Kansas law provided no direct authority on the fact situa-
tion in the present case, but the court of appeals agreed with the district judge's applica-
tion of the dominant views in other jurisdictions.
In using its "discretion to anticipate the rule state courts in similar circumstances
likely would make[,]" Herndon v. Seven Bar Flying Serv. Inc., 716 F.2d 1322, 1332 (10th
Cir. 1983), federal courts "may consider all resources, including... the general weight
and trend of authority." Hartford v. Gibbons & Reed Co., 617 F.2d 567, 569 (10th Cir.
1980).
23. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 517.
24. See Gardner v. HKT Realty Corp., 744 S.W.2d 735, 737-38 (Ark. Ct. App. 1988);
Linn Corp. v. LaSalle Nat'l Bank, 424 N.E.2d 676, 678-79 (Ill. Ct. App. 1981); Wharf
Restaurant, Inc. v. Port of Seattle, 605 P.2d 334, 340-41 (Wash. Ct. App. 1979); Sosanie v.
Pernetti Holding Corp., 279 A.2d 904, 907-08 (NJ. Super. 1971).
25. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 516.
26. Id. at 517.
27. Id
28. EVCO Distfib., Inc. v. Brandau, 626 P.2d 1192, 1196 (Kan. Ct. App. 1981). See
also Frets v. Capitol Fed. Say. & Loan Ass'n, 712 P.2d 1270, 1276 (Kan. 1986) (legal right
is sufficient consideration for a promise); Snuffer v. Westbrook, 795 P.2d 950, 951 (Kan.
1932) (forebearance is usually sufficient consideration for a contract).
29. EVCO, 626 P.2d at 1196-97. "Forbearance to sue can be good consideration ... if




V. No BREACH OF IMPLIED DuTY OF GOOD FArrH UNDER JOINT
OPERATING AGREEMENT ABSENT BREACH OF SPECIFIC
CONTRACT PROVISIONS: DAVIS v. TXO PRODUCTION
CORP. 
3 1
Based on Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit found no breach of im-
plied duty of good faith to perform under an operating agreement ab-
sent breach of specific contractual provisions. This decision conforms
to Tenth Circuit precedent concerning the existence of a joint venture
between parties to an operating agreement.
3 2
As operator under a joint operating agreement, William Davis (Da-
vis) brought suit against the owner of a nonoperating interest, TXO Pro-
duction Corp. (TXO). Davis asserted that TXO had breached the
implied covenant of good faith and fair dealing by making false and ma-
licious statements concerning Davis's operation of oil and gas units.
The district court dismissed Davis's claim for failure to state a cause of
action for which relief could be granted. On appeal, the judgment was
affirmed.
The Tenth Circuit applied the district court's analysis that Davis's
claim arose out of a recognized fiduciary duty between co-tenants of an
oil and gas lease.3 3 Here, no breach existed because TXO had per-
formed on its obligations under the express covenants of the contract.
There was no evidence, therefore, to indicate that TXO breached its
implied duty to perform.
3 4
The court also rejected Davis's argument that an implied duty of
good faith exists independent of a fiduciary duty. Davis based its argu-
ment on the concept that neither party may do anything to impede the
other party's right to the "fruits of the contract,"3 5 but the facts of this
case did not present a such a situation. Davis did not adequately allege
he was deprived of any fruits of the contract or that TXO's actions
harmed the joint estate.3 6 The joint operating agreement did not spec-
ify a plan for unitization or require TXO's cooperation with such a
plan,3 7 and the agreement did not prohibit TXO from voicing its opin-
ion of the operators.3 8
30. Car-X, 927 F.2d at 518.
31. 929 F.2d 1515 (10th Cir. 1991).
32. Frankfort Oil Co. v. Snakard, 279 F.2d 436, 443 (10th Cir. 1960).
33. See Teel v. Public Serv. Co, 767 P.2d 391, 396 (Okla. 1985).
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VI. EXPECTATION DAMAGES APPLY IN BREACH OF CONTRACT FROM
CANCELLED ORDERS: ORAL-X CORPORATION v. FARNAM
COMPANIES, INC 3 9
A product supplier is entitled to damages for royalties on cancelled
orders. Through this decision, the Tenth Circuit maintains the tradition
of awarding damages so that the non-breaching party is placed in the
position he or she would have been in had the breach not occurred.40
Oral-X Corp. (Oral) is a manufacturer of nutritional paste for hor-
ses. Famam Companies, Inc. (Famam) is a large nation-wide seller of
horse care products. These parties entered into a contract that required
Oral to manufacture and sell its product to Farnam for a specified price
plus a ten percent royalty on the ultimate sale price. Farnam cancelled
several orders and terminated the contract after discovering that a small
amount of Oral's product was improperly manufactured. Oral sued
Farnam for the purchase price and royalties for products received and
sold by Farnam as well as the royalties on orders cancelled by Famam.
Famam counterclaimed on the basis of breach of express and implied
warranties of merchantability.
The district court concluded that the product did not breach any
warranties and awarded damages to Oral-X for the unpaid production
costs and royalites on the products actually shipped.4 1 However, it did
not award royalites on orders placed and cancelled by Famam4 2 because
the price and uncertainty of an actual sale were too "speculative." ' 43
The Tenth Circuit affirmed the district court's judgment that no
warranties of merchantibility were breached. Although Oral-X shipped
a small amount of defective product to Famam, "[t]his slight variation
did not constitute a material breach of contract excusing Farnam's
performance."
'44
The Tenth Circuit reversed the district court decision not to award
damages for royalties on cancelled orders based on uncertainty about
the sale and price of the product.4 5 Oral-X was entitled to recover roy-
alty payments it would have received had Farnam performed. This de-
termination was based on the established proposition that damages are
awarded to place the non-breaching party in the same position as if the
contract been performed. 46 Had Famam performed and sold the prod-
uct, Oral-X would have received royalties on the product sold. Further,
the contract itself established Oral-X's expectation that it would receive
39. 931 F.2d 667 (10th Cir. 1991).
40. Id. at 670 (citing RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 344(a) (1981); J.
CALAMARI &J. PERILLO, CONTRACTS § 14-4 (3d ed. 1987) (citing U.C.C. § 1-106; 5 ARTHUR
LINTON CORBIN, CONTRACTS § 992 (1964); CHARLES T. MCCORMICK, DAMAGES § 137
(1934); 11 SAMUEL WILUSTON, CONTRACTS § 1338 (1968)).
41. Oral-X, 931 F.2d at 668.
42. Id
43. Id at 671.
44. Id at 670. SeeJ. WHITE & R. SUMMERS, UNIFORM COMMERCIAL CODE § 10-2 (3d
ed. 1988).
45. Oral-X, 931 F.2d at 671.
46. See A.R.A. Mfg. Co. v. Pierce, 341 P.2d 928, 932 (Ariz. 1959).
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royalties after the product was sold.47 The district court's distinction
between the orders Oral-X shipped and those Farnam cancelled was er-
roneous in both cases because although the amount of royalties due
would be difficult to determine, recovery for lost profits should not be
denied.4 8 The court then remanded for determination of damages
based on the orders Farnam cancelled.
VIi. NONOCCURRENCE OF CONDITION PRECEDENT DIscHARGEs DuTY
TO PERFORM: B-B COMPANY V. PIPER JAFFRAY &
HOPWOOD, INC.
4 9
When a contract is based on the occurrence of some future event,
such as obtaining approval for a special improvement district, nonoccur-
rence of such a condition precedent discharges the other party's duty to
perform. The following case illustrates the established principle that
failure of a condition precedent invalidates the contract. 50
B-B Co. (BB) planned to use proceeds from special improvement
district bonds to purchase and develop resort property. BB was to ar-
range for industrial revenue bonds from the municipal government
while Piper Jaffray & Hopwood, Inc. (Piper) would underwrite the
bonds. BB was was unable to get approval'for the special improvement
districts and Piper refused to underwrite the project. BB sued Piper for
breach of promise to underwrite the bonds. After hearing arguments,
the district court granted Piper's motion for summary judgment holding
that B-B had failed to meet an essential condition precedent. 5 1
The Tenth Circuit affirmed after giving BB's argument closer scru-
tiny.52 BB asserted that the original agreement with Piper was based on
Piper's promise to underwrite about $2,000,000 in bonds for the pro-
ject. BB claimed that Piper's failure to underwrite the bonds forced it to
abandon the project at considerable time and expense. However, the
Tenth Circuit found that since BB was unable to arrange for the special
improvement districts there was nothing for Piper to underwrite. 5 A
condition precedent existed for BB to establish the special improvement
districts. 54 When this condition was not satisfied, Piper's duty of per-
formance under the contract was discharged.
55
47. Oral-X, 931 F.2d at 670.
48. Id
49. 931 F.2d 675 (10th Cir. 1991).
50. Absent case precedent, the Tenth Circuit based its decision on secondary author-
ity. "Non-occurrence of a condition precedent discharges the other party's duty of per-
formance." Id at 678. See also RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF CONTRACTS § 275(1) & (2)
(1981).
51. B-B Co., 931 F.2d at 676.
52. Id
53. I at 678.
54. Id "A condition precedent is defined as an act or event, other than a lapse of
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VIII. STANDARD FIDUCIARY RELATIONSHIP OF JOINT VENTURERS MAY
BE CONTRACTED AWAY: DIME Box PETROLEUM CORP. v.
LOUISIANA LAND AND EXPLORATION Co.
5 6
The Tenth Circuit found that the parties in ajoint venture may con-
tract for a different relationship than the standard fiduciary relationship
usually found in ajoint venture agreement. Absent an agreement to the
contrary, Tenth Circuit cases have held that a fiduciary relationship ex-
ists in a joint venture.
5 7
Louisiana Land and Exploration Co. (LL&E) and Dime Box Petro-
leum (Dime Box) entered into certain agreements, including one "farm-
out" agreement, 58 to acquire and develop oil and gas leases. Subse-
quently, the parties entered into an operating agreement which desig-
nated LL&E as operator. The agreement gave LL&E the duty to drill,
complete and produce wells, and Dime Box had a duty to pay its propor-
tionate share of the costs and expenses. Dime Box brought suit claiming
LL&E breached its fiduciary duty under the operating agreement based
on overcharges and fraud. LL&E counterclaimed that Dime Box had
breached its agreement to pay for its share of the acquisition of oil and
gas leases.
The district court held in favor of LL&E since the operating agree-
ment was not ajoint venture agreement and concluded that no fiduciary
relationship had been created. 59
While the Tenth Circuit affirmed, it disagreed with the lower court's
analysis that no joint venture was created by the operating agreement.
The facts at trial established a joint venture:60 the parties had a joint
interest in the leases; they had an express agreement to share in the
profits or losses; and their conduct showed cooperation in the ven-
ture.6 ' The court further found that the nature of this joint venture cre-
ated a fiduciary relationship based on LL&E's control over the
operation 62 but the parties had contracted for a different standard than
that which is traditionally applied to fiduciaries. The operating agree-
ment provided that "operator has no liability to nonoperator for negli-
gence or unintentional misconduct." 63 While such a standard is not the
traditional measure of a fiduciary relationship, the trial court did not err
in concluding the parties contracted for a standard that modified the
56. 938 F.2d 1144 (10th Cir. 1991).
57. See Rajara v. Allied Corp., 919 F.2d 610, 623 (10th Cir. 1990); Cascade Energy
and Metals Corp. v. Banks, 896 F.2d 1557, 1570 (10th Cir. 1990).
58. A "farm-out" agreement occurs when an oil and gas lessee agrees to assign its
lease to another party who earns its interest in the leased minerals by drilling a well.
59. 717 F. Supp. 717 (D. Colo. 1989).
60. In Colorado, three elements are required to establish a joint venture: a joint in-
terest in property; an express or implied agreement to share in the profits or losses and
conduct showing cooperation in the venture. Dime Box, at 1147. See Agland, Inc. v. Koch
Truck Line, Inc., 757 P.2d 1138 (Colo. Ct. App. 1988); Fullenwider v. Writer Corp., 544
P.2d 408, 410 (Colo. Ct. App. 1975).
61. Dime Box, 938 F.2d at 1147.
62. Id.




IX. ABSENT EVIDENCE OF No ARMS-LENGTH BARGAIN, FIDUCIARY
RELATIONSHIP DOES NOT EXIST: DEVERY IMPLEMENT Co. v.
J.L CASE CO.
65
Based on Oklahoma law, the Tenth Circuit held that a farm equip-
ment manufacturer did not have a fiduciary relationship with a dealer
under a dealership agreement because there was no evidence that the
parties were not bargaining at arms length at the time of the agreement.
This decision is based on the Oklahoma practice of looking for lack of an
arms-length transaction before finding a fiduciary duty.
66
Devery Implement Co. (Devery), a farm equipment dealer, sold
parts and service for Steiger tractors. 67 Devery brought an action
against J.I. Case Co. (Case)68 after Case terminated the dealership
agreement for lack of sales. Devery claimed that the termination consti-
tuted a breach of fiduciary duty by Case.
Ajury returned a verdict for Devery finding that a fiduciary relation-
ship existed between Devery and Case.69 The Tenth Circuit reversed
the jury verdict finding no evidence to indicate that the parties had not
bargained at arms length.70 The decision stated that the district court's
ruling on the existence of a fiduciary relationship was "inherently con-
tradictory"71 because it found the agreement could be terminated at
will, which indicates an arms-length bargain, but also that a fiduciary
relationship could exist in the contract which implicates lack of an arms-
length transaction.
72
The Tenth Circuit also looked to other Oklahoma precedent to de-
termine whether a fiduciary relationship existed in this case. In
Oklahoma, a fiduciary relationship can arise when confidence or trust
from one party establishes the dominance or control of another.73 The
facts in this case, however, were not indicative of a fiduciary relationship,
particularly because Devery did not sell Steiger products as its primary
line. Devery sold several other lines, indicating that Devery was not in a
weak position relative to Case, therefore it could not be concluded that
Devery was forced to substitute Case's will for its own.74 The court con-
cluded that a fiduciary duty could arise out of a dealership agreement if
64. Id at 1148.
65. 944 F.2d 724 (10th Cir. 1991).
66. Id at 730 (citing Appleman v. Kansas-Nebraska Natural Gas Co., 217 F.2d 843,
848-49 (10th Cir. 1955).
67. Steiger Tractors Inc. was also a defendant named in this action.
68. Tenneco, Inc. acquired Stieger Tractors, Inc. and subsequently assigned Steiger
to J.I. Case Company, one of Tenneco, Inc's subsidiaries.
69. Devery, 944 F.2d at 725.
70. Id. at 732.
71. Id at 731.
72. Id
73. Id at 729.
74. Id. at 731.
1992]
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the facts showed an imposition of trust and confidence. 75
X. WAIVER OF REFUND BY VOLUNTARILY PAYING PRICES IN EXCESS OF
CONTRACT: PRENALTA CORP. V COLORADO INTERSTATE GAS Co.
7 6
The Tenth Circuit found that sufficient evidence existed to remand
the case on the issue of whether Colorado Interstate Gas Co. (CIG)
waived its right to pay the escalated base price of a gas purchase contract
by paying a higher price during settlement negotiations. This decision
applies the "voluntary payment" rule, recognized under Wyoming law,
which holds that a party may not later recover damages for payments
made voluntarily.
77
Prenalta Corp. (Prenalta) and other parties named in the action,
owned working interests in several natural gas wells in Wyoming. CIG
is a company that purchases and transports gas. Prenalta and CIG en-
tered into long-term contracts whereby CIG would purchase the gas
produced from Prenalta's wells. At the time the contracts were exe-
cuted, the price of gas was regulated by the federal government.
78
However, Prenalta, anticipating deregulation and a resulting decrease in
gas prices negotiated as part of the agreement with CIG for "take-or-
pay" clauses,79 and a clause permitting it to seek a redetermination of
the price for gas under the contract. If Prenalta failed to seek redetermi-
nation of prices within six months after deregulation, the price-escalat-
ing provisions of the contract would take effect. When deregulation
occurred, CIG refused to make payments to Prenalta based on the
"take-or-pay" provision. After negotiations failed, Prenalta brought
suit.
The district court granted summary judgment to CIG, finding that
the contract provision was clear and unambiguous.8 0 Further, Prenalta
was entitled to a refund of any prices paid over the amount set forth in
the escalated-price base.
8 1
The Tenth Circuit reversed and remanded finding there was suffi-
cient evidence to present a factual question as to whether CIG waived its
right to a refund.8 2 "Waiver is the intentional relinquishment of a
known right manifested in an unequivocal manner."8 3 CIG's retroactive
75. Id. at 730.
76. 944 F.2d 677 (10th Cir. 1991).
77. Fulton v. DesJardins, 227 P.2d 240, 245 (Wyo. 1951).
78. Interstate transport and sale of gas under these contracts was regulated by the
Federal Energy Regulatory Commission (F.E.R.C.) until January 1, 1985, when the prices
under two of the contracts were deregulated by the Natural Gas Policy Act of 1978, 15
U.S.C. § 3331 (1978). Id. at 679.
79. A take-or-pay clause requires the purchaser to take a minimum quantity of gas
annually from a well or pay for a specified quantity whether actually taken from the well-
site or not. Id. at 680.
80. Id. at 684.
81. Id.
82. Id. at 685.
83. Id. (quoting St. Paul Fire & Marine Ins. Co. v. Albany County School Dist. No. 1,
763 P.2d 1255, 1262 (Wyo. 1988).
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and continuous payments presented a question of fact of whether it had
intentionally relinquished its claim to the refund. Wyoming law regard-
ing voluntary payments precluded GIG from asserting entitlement to a




The cases analyzed follow the well-established principle of holding
parties to the promises made, especially when changing circumstances
such as deregulated gas prices make the contract less than an ideal bar-
gain. The Tenth Circuit continues to be reluctant to find a fiduciary
relationship where the contracting parties are in relatively equal
positions.
In sum, this year's Tenth Circuit decisions have been consistent
with those of past years. Given current economic trends, decisions in
contract law will probably continue to hold parties to the conditions of
their contracts and not hold one party more responsible than another
unless there is clear evidence of dominance or control.
Eileen A. Bonnet
84. ld "[M]oney voluntarily paid under a claim of right to the payment, and with
knowledge of the facts by the person making the payment, cannot be recovered back on
the ground that... there was no liability to pay in the first instance." (quoting Fulton v.
DesJardins, 227 P.2d 240, 245 (Wyo. 1951).
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